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Curtis E.A. Karnow*

And you may ask yourself
Well . . . How did I get here?**

I. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND REASONS

*Judge of the California Superior Court, County of San Francisco.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 2016)

05/10/2017 10:58:23

**Talking Heads, Once in a Lifetime, on Remain in Light (Sire Records 1980).
1. E.g., JON B. EISENBERG ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL APPEALS AND
WRITS ¶ 8:15 (noting that “[t]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an
appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct”), ¶ 8:224 (characterizing “general
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Trial judges are comforted by the usual standard of review,
which is—in plain English—that their decisions are assumed to
be right, if only in the sense that the appellant usually has the
burden of showing otherwise. Doctrines of harmless error and
others tend to focus on the result below and, if the record
supports the result, urge affirmance. The record might be barren,
it might reveal a trial judge’s incorrect rationale, but if the result
is otherwise supportable, the trial judge is usually affirmed. 1
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But there are a few situations in which appellate courts
focus on the reasons provided and will reverse if the reasons do
not support the result or the reasoning is wrong—even if the
result has support in the record. I came across this in California
state law, as I was having a look at the standards of review of
decisions to certify (or not to certify) class actions. This is the
class-certification standard, distinguished from the usual rule:
Under ordinary appellate review, we do not address the trial
court’s reasoning and consider only whether the result was
correct. . . . But when denying class certification, the trial
court must state its reasons, and we must review those
reasons for correctness. . . . We may only consider the
reasons stated by the trial court and must ignore any
unexpressed reason that might support the ruling. 2

We might call this the Rule of Stated Reasons. 3 It will be the
focus of this article, but we begin by looking at two other rules
from which the Rule of Stated Reasons must be differentiated.
A. Background: The Routine Rule

05/10/2017 10:58:23

rule” as “affirmance on any correct ground” (emphasis in original)) (Nov. 2016)
[hereinafter PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS].
2. Knapp v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 932, 939 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
3. See generally, e.g., PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at
¶ 8:225 (noting that “the appellate court must examine the trial court’s reasons for the
ruling”). This state rule does not appear to have a federal analogue. Compare, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:53 (noting that standards of
review for class actions “mirror ordinary standards of review”), § 14:19 (indicating that
appellate courts “review trial courts’ class action decisions (certification, final approval,
and fee approval) under ordinary appellate rules”) (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter NEWBERG];
Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing appellate court’s
approach to petitions for interlocutory review of trial court’s grant or denial of class
certification).
4. Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (Cal. 2007).
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We must distinguish a different rule, which applies
generally, including in the certification context: “A certification
order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported
by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it
rests on erroneous legal assumptions.” 4 This rule is ordinary. It
is routine to reverse if there is no factual support for a decision
or the trial judge gets the law wrong. It is not this Routine Rule I
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am interested in here, although as we will see later, some courts
rely on the Routine Rule as if it necessarily justified the Rule of
Stated Reasons. It does not, however, for one may have the
former without the latter.
B. Background: The Rule of Intendments
There is a third rule of review, also seemingly routine, that
we should also distinguish: “We must ‘[p]resum[e] in favor of
the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial
court could reasonably deduce from the record.’” 5 This third
rule is part of the broader and usual standard, which, if one
enjoyed the sound of old fashioned words, one might call the
Rule of Intendments. 6 Under this broad rule, when the record is
silent, the order is generally affirmed. 7 In the certification
context, the more general, broader Rule of Intendments is not
effective. If nothing “illuminates the court’s thinking” on the
reasons for the determination, the case is reversed and
remanded. 8 The Rule of Intendments does not apply. 9

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 25 Side A
05/10/2017 10:58:23

5. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1022 (Cal. 2012) (quoting Sav–
on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 319, 329 (Cal. 2004) (ellipses in original)).
6. From a case almost a century ago: “In an appeal on the judgment-roll alone every
intendment possible is in favor of the judgment or order appealed from, and if error does
not affirmatively appear, it will be sustained, if there is any possible ground on which it can
be sustained.” Myers v. Canepa, 37 Cal. App. 556, 560 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918) (citation
omitted). A newer case to the same effect is Seibert v. City of San Jose, 247 Cal. App. 4th
1027, 1042 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (noting strong presumption that order entered below
is correct).
7. E.g., Elena S. v. Kroutik, 247 Cal. App. 4th 570, 574 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(indicating that a “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct” and that “[a]ll
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record
is silent” (emphasis in original)); A.G. v. C.S., 246 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1281 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (same).
8. Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1064 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2015). The trial judge in Tellez found that a party failed to adhere to the court’s procedures
to contest tentative rulings, and was thus barred from argument, which (and here is the
error) in the judge’s view obviated the need to explain himself. Id. at 1060, 1064 n.12.
9. See, for example, Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522 (Cal.
2014), in which only the concurring justice suggested that the Rule of Intendments applied.
Id. at 546 (Chin, J., concurring).
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C. Our Primary Concern: The Rule of Stated Reasons
What then, is this narrower Rule of Stated Reasons that
applies in the certification context? It is not clear; but it may just
mean that when a judge does explain himself or herself in a way
that suggests reliance on facts, the appellate court will indulge
the trial court ruling if there is any basis in the record to do so.
I began by briefly outlining the various standards of review
because the opinions that develop the Rule of Stated Reasons
ultimately dissolve into the distant mists of the past, sometimes
doing so by conflating the Rule of Stated Reasons with these
other standards of review.
The Rule of Stated Reasons is an oddity, and has been
repeatedly called out as different from the usual approach. 10
Why, then, did it develop? No one knows. This article provides
a guided tour to its genealogy, and shows that its origins are lost
to us. It ends with some thoughts as to why, nevertheless, the
Rule of Stated Reasons is as it is, and also considers its
implications for the work of judges and lawyers.
II. TRACING THE RULE OF STATED REASONS

05/10/2017 10:58:23

10. E.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611–12 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (asserting that formulations like the Routine Rule, with their deference to lower
courts, have “nothing to do with the standard of review” for certification orders in class
actions because “[t]he right result is an inadequate substitute for an incorrect process” in
that situation, and concluding that “appellate scrutiny should be on the reasons expressed
by the trial court in the context of counsel’s arguments, not merely whether the trial court
reached a result which can be justified by implication”); Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 18
Cal. App. 4th 644, 655–56 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (calling Rule of Stated Reasons an
“exception to the general rule” (citation omitted)); Knapp, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 939
(indicating that Rule of Stated Reasons “differs from ordinary appellate review”).

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 25 Side B

One might start almost anywhere in the last few years with
a decision reviewing a certification or decertification order, and
then trace the citations back through the ages, or through the
decades anyway. Significantly, this is one of the few areas of
law in which one sees only the citation or repetition of the rule,
never a discussion of its rationale. Despite frequently
introducing the Rule of Stated Reasons as an exception to the
usual standard of review, no court has felt an obligation to
explain it. This both makes it relatively simple to trace the rule,
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and leads to the ultimate frustration of never discovering at least
an historical explanation for its development.
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix walk the reader through
scores of cases, starting with two recent cases and following
them back in what might be termed the main sequence. That
work is checked, as shown in Table 3, by using a number of
other recent cases as starting points to retrace the same steps. In
all of these tracings, we see that the citation chain usually
touches down first on Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.11 and then, most
significantly, proceeds through Linder to Clothesrigger, Inc. v.
GTE Corp. 12
For cases decided after 2000, Linder is probably the single
most cited case in support of the Rule of Stated Reasons, with
eight of the cases in what this article treats as the main sequence
citing it directly. In a single paragraph, the California Supreme
Court in Linder recites a series of standards that it means to
apply, and explains their intended effect:

From this statement, we must extract the rules. First, note
the premise of deferral to the trial judge, especially because of
the practical aspect of the certification order. The initial use of
the word “because” suggests, accurately, that this reason

05/10/2017 10:58:23

11. 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435–36, 448 (Cal. 2000).
12. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 611–12. The Linder court cites both Caro and Clothesrigger in
its discussion of this point, noting that Caro relies on Clothesrigger. Linder, 23 Cal. 4th at
435–36.
13. Linder, 23 Cal. 4th at 435–36.

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 26 Side A

Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the
efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action,
they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying
certification. The denial of certification to an entire class is
an appealable order . . . , but in the absence of other error, a
trial court ruling supported by substantial evidence
generally will not be disturbed “unless (1) improper criteria
were used . . .; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were
made . . . ” . . . . Under this standard, an order based upon
improper criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal
“‘even though there may be substantial evidence to support
the court’s order.’” . . . Accordingly, we must examine the
trial court’s reasons for denying class certification. “Any
valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the
order.” 13
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explains the rules that are about to be recited. 14 Next, we see that
the certification order is appealable; then we see the Routine
Rule that looks to substantial evidence and a lack of legal
error. 15 But then Linder seems to say that the next rule recited—
our focus, the Rule of Stated Reasons—is either equivalent to
the Routine Rule or is explained or justified by it.
We have already seen above that such an equivalence is
false, and it is not at all obvious that the Routine Rule justifies or
explains the Rule of Stated Reasons. Linder’s citation to
Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. 16 gives it away: Richmond
only recites the Routine Rule, not the Rule of Stated Reasons,
making it a dead end in the search for the origin of the latter.
Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court 17 and Fletcher v.
Security Pacific National Bank, 18 the cases on which Richmond
relies, are also dead ends. And we need not look far for cases in
which the Routine Rule patently applies without any suggestion
that a failure to state reasons is fatal: An appellate court might
well insist on substantial evidence but still indulge the lower
court with the Rule of Intendments. 19 Indeed, the standard of
review that insists on substantial evidence but nevertheless so
indulges the trial court uses rules that are “natural and logical
corollar[ies]” of each other; the tests actually go hand in hand.20

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 26 Side B
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14. See infra § IV.
15. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
16. 29 Cal. 3d 462 (1981). The Richmond court’s discussion does not make reference to
the Rule of Stated Reasons:
For example, in the absence of other error, this court will not disturb a trial court
ruling on class certification which is supported by substantial evidence unless (1)
improper criteria were used (see Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976)
18 Cal.3d 355, 361 [134 Cal. Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750]); or (2) erroneous legal
assumptions were made (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23
Cal.3d 442, 446 [153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51]).
Id. at 470.
17. See note 16, supra.
18. See note 16, supra.
19. See, e.g., A.G., 246 Cal. App. 4th at 1281 (quoting rule).
20. Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 227, 237 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(referring to “fundamental principles” of appellate review: presuming that judgment below
is correct, indulging all “intendments and presumptions . . . in favor of correctness,” and
requiring appellant to prove error); see also, e.g., Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim
Integrated Prods., Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th 243, 266 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Apex
LLC v. Korusfood.com, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (referring
to “normal rules of appellate review”); Wallis v. PHL Assocs., Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 814,
825 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Ellis v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th
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At least as of Linder, then, we have no explanation for the quite
distinct Rule of Stated Reasons.
So where can we turn after Linder? We follow its clues. It
relies on Caro, 21 which as Linder notes, relies on
Clothesrigger, 22 and National Solar. 23 There is no more to say
about National Solar, because it just relies on Richmond, a dead
end, and on Clothesrigger.
We have come then to Clothesrigger, the 1987 decision
directly relied on by not only Linder, but also four other cases in
the main sequence, and many other cases as well. The decision
in Clothesrigger is the decisive moment in the development of
the Rule of Stated Reasons.
Clothesrigger discusses standards of review twice. The first
time, it recites the Rule of Stated Reasons, analogizing to
non-statutory situations [that] involve issues where the
appellate focus is on the means used by the trial court. The
right result is an inadequate substitute for an incorrect
process. Thus the appellate scrutiny should be on the
reasons expressed by the trial court in the context of
counsel’s arguments not merely whether the trial court
reached a result which can be justified by implication. 24

05/10/2017 10:58:23

853, 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (using three-factor approach to judgment below:
“presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions . . . indulged in its favor, and
ambiguities . . . resolved in favor of affirmance” (citation omitted)).
21. 18 Cal. App. 4th at 655.
22. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 612.
23. Nat’l Solar Equip. Owners’ Assn. v. Grumman Corp., 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1281
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
24. Clothesrigger, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 611–12 (second emphasis supplied).
25. Id. at 611 (citing B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 262 (3d ed.
1985)).
26. Id. at 612.
27. Id. at 613. The opinion quotes the trial judge’s reasons at some length. Id. at 610–
11.
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In this connection Clothesrigger has a single, lonely citation to a
treatise on procedure. 25 A few lines later, Clothesrigger recites a
different standard: Richmond’s Routine Rule. 26 And indeed the
result in Clothesrigger probably stems from the application of
this last standard, the Richmond rule, because the court first tries
to figure out what the trial judge probably meant and, second,
criticizes what he did say. 27 It does not appear that the trial
judge’s result could have been rescued on appeal if only he had
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stated his thinking correctly or more explicitly. If this is correct,
we have here the first of two wonderful twists: that the Rule of
Stated Reasons—at least in the certification context—was born
in a case to which it did not apply. But this is not shocking. 28
We now turn to the second twist, and Clothesrigger’s novel
articulation of the Rule of Stated Reasons. It is based on a
citation to the Witkin treatise, part of a respected series on both
California procedural 29 and substantive 30 law that is frequently
cited by California’s judges and lawyers as summarizing extant
law. 31 The pages cited in the 1987 Clothesrigger opinion are no
longer generally available, but through the kind assistance of the
Witkin publishers, 32 I have reviewed the section that
Clothesrigger referred to. The original 1985 hardback volume
entry has nothing directly on point. It provides examples of
situations in which judges must state their reasons, including
those in which a statute requires it, such as a motion for a new
trial, a motion for a nonsuit, and when a so-called statement of
decision is mandated. 33 Then Witkin notes non-statutory bases:

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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28. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Scott Baker, Appellate Lawmaking in a Judicial
Hierarchy, 58 J.L. & ECON. 139, 141 (2015) (asserting that “the appellate court wants to
set dicta at a level that optimizes the lower court’s use of those statements”); Judith M.
Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 219
(2010) (summarizing difficulties associated with differentiating holdings from dicta);
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 956 n.4
(2005) (referring to “uncertainty” surrounding “holding-dicta line”). Sometimes what
might have been thought of as a holding is set aside as dicta, Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2012 (1994) (discussing holding in Marbury), and
sometimes what is dicta is eagerly embraced as the foundation for a holding, Caroline
Hatton, Comment, TILA: The Textualist-Intentionalist Litmus Act? 44 SETON HALL L.
REV. 207, 237–38 (2014) (considering Third and Ninth Circuits’ deferential approach to
Supreme Court dicta); David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus
Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2021 (2013)
(pointing out that “lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement from a higher
court because it is dictum”).
29. B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2008).
30. B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (10th ed. 2005).
31. Witkin has been celebrated as the “beloved giant in the California legal community.”
Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their Benefit in the Appellate
Court of California, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 n.1 (1995); see also In Memoriam Bernard E.
Witkin (1904–1995), CAL. SUP. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Dec. 3, 1996), http://www.cschs
.org/history/special-sessions/special-sessions-in-memoriam-bernard-e-witkin/ (collecting a
series of tributes by California Supreme Court justices and other state dignitaries).
32. My thanks to John K. Hanft of Thomson-Reuters for making a photocopy of the old
text available.
33. See infra § III.
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when a judge fails to rule on the merits, 34 and similar
situations 35 in which the judge plainly misunderstood the rule, 36
or was biased. In these cases relied on by Witkin, the trial court
expressly got the law wrong or expressly refused to rule. That is
why the appellate court refused in each case to indulge the trial
judge and refused to assume that he or she was right.
So the 1985 Witkin treatise sheds no light on the history
that we seek. The cases it cites do not indicate that the Rule of
Stated Reasons should be imported into the certification context.
We don’t know why the Clothesrigger court cited the Witkin
treatise. It’s a dead end. But in another wonderful example of
the eternally self-reflexive nature of legal citation, here is a
second twist: The 1987 update to this section of the Witkin
treatise relies, without comment, on—Clothesrigger. 37
We might speculate about how the Rule of Stated Reasons
was quietly born in Clothesrigger. It is, after all, not too far a
leap from (i) the Routine Rule 38 that reviews substantial
evidence and legal error, but assumes that the criteria are met, to
(ii) a new rule which, unable to determine if the lower court was
aware of the evidence or the law, declines to assume that the
criteria are met. A court might invoke the Routine Rule that so
“long as that [trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is
founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld,” but,
finding no expression of correct reasons, reverse. 39 Later, that
reasoning might look like the application of the Rule of Stated
Reasons.
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 28 Side A
05/10/2017 10:58:23

34. The supporting citation is Gosnell v. Webb, 60 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) (characterizing this as when “it appears that the trial court has declined to pass
upon the merits of a motion”).
35. The supporting citation is Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) (suggesting that it would be so if court expressly refused to rule on the issues).
36. The supporting citation is Lippold v. Hart, 274 Cal. App. 2d 24, 26 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (noting that court “misconceived” role at hearing and expressly used wrong
test).
37. The citation to Clothesrigger was carried forward to the current edition, 9 B.E.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE ch. XII—Appeal, § 349(8) (5th ed. 2008).
38. Recall the Routine Rule: “A certification order generally will not be disturbed
unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3)
it rests on erroneous legal assumptions.” Fireside Bank, 40 Cal. 4th 1069 at 1089.
39. Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 750, 763 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of
App. 1982).
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Too, there is a price to pay under the Routine Rule. The
court of appeal must review the entire record without direction
from the trial judge. And because trial judges are fact finders in
certification motions, 40 the court of appeal may have to guess
how the trial judge resolved conflicts in the evidence or weighed
the evidence overall. But there is also this: Without some
assurance that the trial judge has really thought about
practicalities, the case might unfold into chaos and wasted years
of litigation. It happens. 41 This allusion to practicality may then
be a hint to the deeper reasons for the Rule of Stated Reasons.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE OF STATED REASONS
If direct history sheds no light, we might reach to kindred
areas of law to learn the reason for the Rule. As the Witkin
treatise notes, some statutes simply require a statement of
reasons. 42 Judges are required after a bench trial to provide a
statement of decision to support the judgment. 43 California’s
Code of Civil Procedure requires a statement of reasons for a
new trial. 44 (But the appellate remedy here is not, as it appears
to be in the certification motion, to reverse and remand. 45 Rather
the courts of appeal shift from an abuse of discretion standard 46
to a de novo review. 47) Judges must make such a record when

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 28 Side B
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40. See infra note 61.
41. See, e.g., Duran v. U.S. Bank N.A., 59 Cal. 4th 1, 29 (Cal. 2014) (discussing
importance of assessing—and reassessing—manageability of individual issues).
42. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
43. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 632 (providing that on request the “court shall issue a
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision”); CAL. R. CT.
3.1590 (setting out procedures governing the preparation of a statement of decision).
44. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 657 (providing that order granting motion for new trial “must
state the ground or grounds relied upon by the court, and may contain the specification of
reasons”).
45. See, e.g., Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062 (noting that any plausible reason will be
sufficient to uphold order entered by court denying class certification, but court must state
its reasons and reviewing court will review them for “correctness”).
46. E.g., Sprewell v. Jurjevic, Nos. A125569/A126272, 2011 WL 1260430, at *4 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (“When the trial court grants a motion for new trial and
provides a statement of reasons for its decision, the standard of review is abuse of
discretion.”) (unpublished).
47. E.g., Oakland Raiders v. Nat’l Football League, 41 Cal. 4th 624, 628 (Cal. 2007)
(affirming result based on independent review by court of appeals); Montoya v. Barragan,
220 Cal. App. 4th 1215, 1228 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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they dismiss criminal charges. 48 Federal courts are required to
state their reasons when issuing preliminary injunctions, 49 but
not, it seems, state courts—at least in California. 50 But
California judges must issue orders explaining their reasons
when deciding motions for summary judgment, 51 and without
that record the case can be reversed and remanded to get it. 52 In
the federal system, written findings are required when reviewing
parole determinations 53 and when departing from sentencing
guidelines. 54
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48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (providing that “reasons for the dismissal shall be
stated orally on the record” and that the judge “shall also set forth the reasons in an order
entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in which the
proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter”); see
also, e.g., People v. Ray, No. C035003, 2001 WL 1627987, at *3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Dec.
18, 2001) (“Notwithstanding the deferential standard of review, we must reverse and
remand this matter to the trial court for two reasons. First, the court’s minute order does not
include a reviewable statement of reasons for its decision.”) (unpublished).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 65; see also, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d
380, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that Rule 65 requires a “statement of reasons”).
50. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1450–51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (indicating that the reviewing court’s responsibility is to “review [the] order, not the
court’s reasons,” that a trial court is “not required to prepare a statement of decision or
explain its reasoning,” and that the reviewing court will “presume the court considered
every pertinent argument and resolved each one consistently with its minute order denying
the preliminary injunction”); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal.
App. 3d 831, 838 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that reviewing court indulges “all
reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order” (citation omitted)).
51. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 437c(g) (providing that “[t]he court shall record its
determination by court reporter or written order”).
52. E.g., Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 88 Cal. App. 4th
439, 448–499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (indicating that “failure to provide a sufficient
statement of reasons is not automatic grounds for reversal,” but finding that failure in this
case “was not harmless error”). There may be some disagreement about the consequences
of a trial judge’s failure to issue the required order. Oddly, relying on this Santa Barbara
case that does reverse and remand, another case says there is no need to do so, perhaps
because there was some explanation in the trial court. Hom v. Culinary Inst. of Am., No.
A132499, 2012 WL 1107797, at *6 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012) (indicating that
appellate court reviews “the validity of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons,” and that “a
deficient statement of reasons presents no harm when the validity of a summary judgment
has been established”) (unpublished); see also Hasso v. Hasso, 148 Cal. App. 4th 329, 338
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (using de novo review and finding harmless error even with
insufficient statement from trial judge).
53. E.g., Misasi v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987) (faulting
stated reasons as “factually incorrect” and “non-specific”).
54. E.g., United States v. Salem, 597 F.3d 877, 888 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that
although requirement may be satisfied in several ways, “a pro forma checking of a box on a
preprinted form” is insufficient); United States v. Baham, 215 F. App’x 258, 261 (4th Cir.
2007) (pointing out that “[a] sentence will be procedurally unreasonable . . . if the district
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In the context of this inquiry into the Rule of Stated
Reasons, it is especially interesting that court review of an
administrative agency involves an evaluation of whether the
agency has made a sufficient record—an “adequate statement of
reasons.” 55 With that statement of reasons, when the agency
decision is plainly within the scope of the agency’s expertise,
courts defer to that expertise:
In general . . . the inquiry is limited to whether the decision
was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary
support. . . . When making that inquiry, the “court must
ensure that an agency has adequately considered all
relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection
between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of
the enabling statute.” 56

Reviewing administrative determinations involves the same
ordinary Routine Rule, applied when the aim of the review is to
determine if there is substantial evidence and if the correct law
was employed. 57 Courts review for “legal error and substantial
evidence.” 58 In part, this is the result of the agencies’ role in fact
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court provides an inadequate statement of reasons”); cf. United States v. Bell, 371 F.3d
239, 246 (5th Cir. 2004) (indicating that appellate court, unable to “resolve the uncertainty
from the court’s written statement, . . . decline[d] to proceed without a clearer
understanding of the district court’s reasons”).
55. E.g., Logan v. Principi, 71 F. App’x 836, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (indicating that
reviewing court is to determine, among other things, whether the conclusion below “is
supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases”); Donovan v. Local 6, Wash.
Teachers’ Union, 747 F.2d 711, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting, in case under LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, that the required statement “should inform the
court and the complaining union member of both the grounds of decision and the essential
facts upon which the Secretary’s inferences are based”); see also ( Levi Family P’ship, L.P.
v. City of L.A., 241 Cal. App. 4th 123, 131–32 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (indicating that
agency must find facts “sufficient” to enable judicial review by “bridging the analytic gap
between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order” (citation omitted)).
56. Hi-Desert Med. Ctr. v. Douglas, 239 Cal. App. 4th 717, 730 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (quoting O.W.L. Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 168 Cal. App. 4th 568, 585–86
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). But when the decision involves a “fundamental vested right”
appellate review is more stringent. PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at
¶ 8:127a (referring to reviewing court’s examination of the record and exercise of
independent judgment).
57. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
58. N. Cnty. Advocates v. City of Carlsbad, 241 Cal. App. 4th 94, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., City of Hayward v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. St.
Univ., 242 Cal. App. 4th 833, 839–40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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finding; 59 the substantial evidence test is premised on the
inferior tribunal’s fact-finding powers.
Given the great deference provided to agencies, it is
essential that the process and methods used by the agency are
correct, for that likely ends up being the sole assurance of a
legitimate determination. That is, the extent of deference
correlates with the extent to which the agency’s process of
determination is procedurally correct. In some cases the
harmless error standard is not applicable. 60
So it is that in the context of administrative review we have
a requirement of written reasons (as well as the routine rule of
reversing when there is no substantial evidence, or the legal
standards are mistaken). These are also the rules that apply when
an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s certification order. In
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59. Atieh v. Riordan, 797 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2015) (describing “narrow” standard
of review that permits appellate court to “set aside an agency’s decision if it is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,’ such as if
it is ‘unsupported by substantial evidence’” (citation omitted)); Organized Vill. of Kake v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a policy change
violates the APA ‘if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without
reasoned explanation for doing so’” (citation omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska v.
Organized Vill. of Kake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1509 (2016); Battelle Mem’l Inst. v.
DiCecca, 792 F.3d 214, 221 (1st Cir. 2015) (determining that record included “substantial
evidence that support[ed] . . . findings and ensuing conclusions”); Berkeley Hillside Pres.
v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. 4th 1086, 1114 (Cal. 2015) (recognizing that “the agency
serves as ‘the finder of fact’” (citation omitted)); Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 230
Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1150 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that reviewing court’s “task
involves ‘some weighing of the evidence’” (citation omitted)).
60. City of Hayward, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 839–40 (noting that review is “de novo” and
that agency’s departure from procedures required by statutory scheme makes its decision
“presumptively prejudicial”); San Lorenzo Valley Cmty. Advocates for Responsible Educ.
v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1375 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (indicating that questions of law—including those related to interpretation and
application of statutory provisions—are reviewed de novo); State Water Res. Control Bd.
Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 723 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that harmless error
standard is “not applicable”); but see Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. Dep’t of Health Servs.,
38 Cal. App. 4th 1574, 1601 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error in required
distribution of information not prejudicial); compare N. Pacifica LLC v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1416, 1434 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that to make
out agency’s violation of open meeting laws, prejudice must be shown). Under the federal
APA, procedural error that affects public comment and other inputs to the record may not
be harmless. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 9:29(3) (3d ed. Feb. 2017 update); see also Nina Golden & Carolyn Young, Harmful
Error: How the Courts’ Failure to Apply the Harmless Error Doctrine Has Obstructed the
ADA’s Standing Spectators Rule, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35 (2008)
(suggesting that harmless-error rule should not be used to eviscerate administrative
process).
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both situations, we have (i) an exceedingly important, usually
decisive, order, and (ii) a very high level of deference, premised
in part on (iii) the fact-finder role of the original forum (the
agency or trial judge). 61 Those factors go far in explaining the
use of these rules of review.
Most of the other situations mapped out above in which a
statement of reasons is required also involve decisive moments
in the case. Most obviously, summary judgment motions and the
statement of decision required to support the ultimate
determination in a case are of such import; so too is the decision
to dismiss a criminal case. And there is considerable discretion
involved in dismissing charges and sentencing (although not
usually in the summary judgment context), and a very high level
of discretion in deciding cases as a fact finder that results in a
statement of decision. Both these factors—a decisive point and a
high level of discretion—are present in certification motions.
As every lawyer who handles class actions knows, the
certification motion is the decisive moment in a case. Very few
of these cases actually go to trial: The moment of truth is the
certification motion. Indeed, if the case is not certified, the
“death knell” doctrine recognizes that it is in effect dead, and an
immediate appeal may be taken. 62 For everyone but the class
representative, the case is actually over if the class is not
certified; for them, the order really is dispositive. 63
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 30 Side B
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61. Trial judges are fact finders in certification motions and can weigh (and even
disbelieve) evidence as they wish. For example, they may give little weight to boilerplate
“identical and undetailed declarations,” Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th
496, 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), and more weight to declarations with specific and
individualized detail, id. at 509–10. See generally Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc., 234 Cal.
App. 4th 967, 981 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (noting great discretion accorded trial judge);
Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 214 Cal. App. 4th 974, 991 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(noting that trial judge “is permitted to credit one party’s evidence over the other’s”); In re
Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that trial judge
is allowed considerable discretion), clarified on denial of reh’g, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)
(declining to revise initial decision); Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th
319, 333–34 (Cal. 2004) (referring to trial court’s discretion in evaluating both
“boilerplate” and “detailed, fact-specific” evidence).
62. See generally Curtis Karnow, Complexity in Litigation: A Differential Diagnosis, 18
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 27 (2015).
63. In re Baycol Cases I & II., 51 Cal. 4th 751, 760, 248 P.3d 681, 686 (Cal. 2011)
(noting that “the action has in fact and law come to an end, as far as the members of the
alleged class are concerned”). If the class representative then fails to appeal the denial, he
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It is also true that the deference accorded to trial judges
making certification decisions is very high—at least, so read the
opinions. 64 What is interesting here is the reason for the
deference. It has to do with the practicalities of the situation,
factors that only the trial judge is in a position to explore. It is
the trial judge who will have to handle the trial, who must
manage the case, who can determine the feasibility of trying the
case as a class action, with or without bifurcation, use of
subclasses, severance of certain issues, phasing, perhaps
extracting issues for class treatment, 65 or the use of referees or
special masters for damages calculation; and so on. Just as an
administrative agency has a scope of expertise quite different
from that of judges, so too trial judges have a presumed
expertise on case and trial management that ought to be allowed
as free a rein as possible: “Because trial courts are ideally
situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of
permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in
granting or denying certification.” 66 Just as the Rule of Stated
Reasons allows the reviewing court to observe that the agency’s
substantial discretion has been exercised, so too in the
certification context the reviewing court wants assurance that the
trial judge’s enormous discretion has been exercised. In both
cases the reviewing court is in a very poor position to decide
whether the result is correct; it can only guard the process. And
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 31 Side A
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or she may forever lose the right to do so. Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 238 Cal.
App. 4th 291, 308 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
64. E.g., Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1022 (characterizing review on appeal as “narrowly
circumscribed” and referring to “great deference” standard articulated in Fireside Bank).
65. For the federal provision, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4). See
generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 132 (2015) (discussing
“‘issue-class’ certification”). California allows certification of “particular issues,” CAL. R.
CT. 3.765(b), although efforts at this kind of certification are very rare. See, e.g., Downing
v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 2010 WL 4233033, at *5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2010)
(involving proposed “liability only” class) (unpublished); Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc.,
178 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1434–35 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same).
66. Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 232 Cal. App. 4th 50, 57 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Sav-on Drug, 34 Cal. 4th at 326); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Super. Ct.,
29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1132 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir. 1995): “A trial court’s class
certification determination is discretionary because ‘it is “a practical problem, and
primarily a factual one with which a [trial] court generally has a greater familiarity and
expertise than does a court of appeal.”’”); Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062 (quoting
Linder, 23 Cal. 4th at 435–46).
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so it is that the process, the method, the procedures, are the
focus when certification orders are reviewed. 67 That review is
impossible absent the Rule of Stated Reasons. This standard is
not, despite some language to the contrary, 68 in derogation of the
trial judge’s broad discretion; it is a concomitant.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

05/10/2017 10:58:23

67. E.g., PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at ¶ 8:225 (quoting multiple
cases on the “criteria” and “analysis” and “reasons” and “process”). See this language from
the primogenitor, Clothesrigger: “Our focus on correct process requires us to reverse even
though there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.” 191 Cal. App. 3d at
612 (emphasis supplied).
68. Knapp, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 939 (“Despite this grant of discretion” Rule of Stated
Reasons imposed (emphasis supplied)); Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th
906, 914 (Cal. 2001) (noting that courts are “afforded great discretion” but “nonetheless”
imposing Rule of Stated Reasons (emphasis supplied)); Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062
(noting review “[d]espite the great discretion” afforded trial courts (emphasis supplied)).
69. See generally ROBERT I. WEIL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 14 (2015) (discussing class actions) [hereinafter PRACTICE
GUIDE—BEFORE TRIAL].
70. 59 Cal. 4th at 29.

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 31 Side B

This look at the standard of review and its rationale has
consequences for trial judges and the lawyers who brief
certification motions before them. The implication is a focus on
manageability—the practical stuff. Of course there are other
factors that must be considered when evaluating a certification
motion, such as numerosity, adequate representation by the
plaintiff as well as by counsel, typicality, common questions,
and so on, 69 but generally these factors—perhaps aside from
common questions—usually are not hotly contested; more
importantly the court of appeal can figure most of these out just
as well as a trial judge. The difficult issues have to do with the
superiority of the class action over individual cases, the very
closely related issue of the extent to which common issues
predominate over individual ones, and so the general issue of
manageability, which embraces those matters.
In Duran, the California Supreme Court directed a very
careful look at the manageability issues. 70 The call has been
repeated in other cases, with instructions to look to “efficient
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and effective means” of resolving the underlying disputes. 71 The
point in certification motions is not, exactly, whether there are
common issues; it is whether the balance of common and
individual issues makes the case manageable. 72 Individual issues
are fine—as long as they can be managed. 73 This is the import
of the predominance and superiority factors. 74
Of course, this sort of practical evaluation is not done by
comparing the raw number of common and individual issues. It
is not an abstract weighing of “important” or “significant” issues
(common or not) against issues that in some vague way are less
important. Instead, the showing often will take the form of a trial
plan—a practical outline of the number and types of witnesses
likely to be testifying, matched to the elements of the claims and
of the significant affirmative defenses. 75 If statistics will be
used, the plan will demonstrate that the analysis can actually be
accomplished, perhaps by way of a pilot study. 76 Presumably
both sides contribute to the plan, plaintiffs in an effort to show
how the class trial can be managed, and defendants hoping to
demonstrate that it cannot. 77 If the class is certified, and later it
appears the trial will not in fact be manageable, the court
decertifies the class. 78
The trial plan is the parties’ forum for discussing the utility
of the procedures noted above such as phasing, bifurcation, issue
certification, and the rest, 79 together with various means to
expedite (and so manage) trial, such as the use of summaries of
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A
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71. Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, 231 Cal. App. 4th 362, 384 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014).
72. Alberts v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care, 241 Cal. App. 4th 388, 394 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015) (noting that “the parties and the trial court focused almost exclusively on
the existence of common issues, to the exclusion of the issue of manageability,” and
“[a]ccordingly, . . . revers[ing] and remand[ing]”).
73. E.g., Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc., 210 Cal. App. 4th 1341, 1369 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2012); Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533 (quoting Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1024); Mies, 234 Cal.
App. 4th at 980.
74. Hale, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 65 n.3.
75. Duran spends considerable time speaking to trial plans, 59 Cal. 4th at 15–16, 31–
48, and this is invoked in Martinez, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 384; see also Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at
533 (quoting Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1024); NEWBERG, supra note 3, at ch. 11 (addressing
trials and trial methods in “aggregate litigation” and jury instructions in class actions).
76. Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 22, 42.
77. E.g., id. at 56 (Liu, J., concurring).
78. Sav-on Drug, 34 Cal. 4th at 335.
79. See text accompanying note 65, supra.
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voluminous documents, statistics, 80 stipulations, bench trials, 81 a
focus (if appropriate) on aggregate and not individual
damages, 82 summaries of noncontroversial depositions, 83 and so
on. It is not enough to list these procedures; the trial plan must
actually explain how in the specific context of the case they will
solve a specific manageability problem. 84
The parties and the trial judge may be handicapped in this,
because the trial plan is proposed early in the life of the case:
Certification is to be sought “as soon as practicable.” 85 The
timing of the motion is very much within the discretion of the
trial court, so the judge, informed by the parties, should allow
time for discovery sufficient to develop the trial plan. In the end,
the parties should propose “innovative procedures” 86 and help
the judge exercise his or her very broad discretion to determine
whether trial is feasible, and so enable the judge to issue an
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80. Compare Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___U.S.___, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016)
(allowing use of statistics associated with a representative sample because employer had
failed to maintain proper records that might otherwise have provided evidence of actual
time each employee spent donning and doffing protective gear), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (disapproving use of sociological testimony about corporate
culture and likelihood that supervisors relied on gender stereotypes because expert could
not testify whether any portion of employees in putative class had been passed over for
promotion because supervisors relied on gender stereotypes).
81. Karnow, supra note 62, at 59–63.
82. Bruno v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 129 n.4 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(explicitly approving use of aggregate calculations in lieu of “summing individual
claims”); see also Evans, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1430 (pointing out that “although a trial
court has discretion to permit a class action to proceed where the damages recoverable by
the class must necessarily be based on estimations, the trial court equally has discretion to
deny certification when it concludes the fact and extent of each member’s injury requires
individualized inquiries that defeat predominance” (emphasis in original)); Bell v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 758 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (indicating that
“economist and statistician” was properly allowed to testify as expert in connection with
employer’s statistical evidence, but also noting that expert’s testimony as to psychological
phenomenon outside his area of expertise was properly excluded).
83. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 11.64, 12:332 (2016).
84. Dunbar v. Albertson’s, Inc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1432 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (pointing out that “the party seeking class certification must explain how the
procedure will effectively manage the issues in question”).
85. PRACTICE GUIDE—BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 69, at ¶ 14:98 (emphasis in original);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785.3 (3d ed. 2016
update) (indicating that “[b]oth under the prior language of the rule and the current
language, the general notion is that, when feasible, the certification decision should be
made promptly”).
86. Linder, 23 Cal. 4th at 440 (quoting Vasquez v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821 (Cal.
1971)).
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informed order of stated reasons—one likely to pass muster on
appeal.
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APPENDIX
I. THE RULE OF STATED REASONS: A GENEALOGY
These tables trace the development of the Rule of Stated
Reasons. A zero after a case name means that the Rule of Stated
Reasons is not discussed in the case, as “Occidental 1986-0,” a
dead end. Some such cases discuss nothing like the Rule of
Stated Reasons; others discuss another rule, such as the Rule of
Intendments. The significant lines of descent center on Linder,
which focuses on Clothesrigger. To aid readability, only names
and years appear in the tables. Full citations follow in Part III.
Table 1
The Mies Line
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Mies 2015, which relies on
Knapp 2011, which relies on
Linder 2000, which relies on
Bartold 2000, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987, which relies on
WITKIN, supra note 37
Richmond 1981-0 (dead end), which relies on
Fletcher 1979-0 (dead end)
Occidental 1986-0 (dead end)
National Solar 1991, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987
Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
Daniels 1993, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987
National Solar 1991
Sav-On 2004, which relies on
Linder 2000
Lockheed 2003-0, which relies on
Linder 2000
Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
Bufil 2008, which relies on
Linder 2000
Quacchia 2004, which relies on
Linder 2000
Corbett 2002, which relies on
Linder 2000
Bartold 2000
Washington Mutual 2001, which relies on
Linder 2000
Capital People 2007, which relies on
Linder 2000
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Timeout for Linder, a significant ancestor case. It is
directly relied on by Knapp, Bufil, Capital People, Quacchia,
Sav-On, Lockheed, Corbett, Washington Mutual, and other cases
that are outside the lines of descent included in this genealogy.
Table 2
The Hataishi Branch

Timeout for Clothesrigger, another significant ancestor. It
is relied on directly by Bartold, National Solar, Daniels, Caro,
and other cases. Through Bartold, Clothesrigger is the key case
relied on by Linder.

39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 34 Side A

Hataishi 2014, which relies on
Linder 2000
Kaldenbach 2009, which relies on
Bartold 2000, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987, which relies on
WITKIN, supra note 37
Richmond 1981-0 (dead end), which relies on
Fletcher 1979-0 (dead end)
Occidental 1986-0 (dead end)
National Solar 1991, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987
Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
Daniels 1993, which relies on
Clothesrigger 1987
National Solar 1991
Caro 1993, which relies on
Petherbridge 1974-0, which relies on
Gold Strike 1970-0, which relies on
City of New York 1969-0 (dead end)
Interpace 1971-0 (dead end), which relies on
Platt 1964-0 (dead end)
National Solar 1991
Daniels 1993
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II. TRIBUTARIES
Each recent citing case joins either the Mies Line or the
Hataishi Branch or terminates in a dead end: Jaimez relies on
Linder and Ramirez (which relies on Kaldenbach, Bartold,
Linder, and Caro). Weinstat relies on Bartold, Linder, and
Capitol People. Ayala and Brinker rely on Linder. Dynamex is a
dead end.
Table 3
Other Recent Citations to Ancestor Cases

Benton 2013

Jaimez 2010

Jones 2013

Linder 2000, Weinstat 2010

Thompson 2013

Linder 2000, Kaldenbach 2009, Sav-On 2004

Williams 2013

Weinstat 2010, Ramirez 2013, Jaimez 2010, Bufil 2008

Cochran 2014

Knapp 2011

Hale 2014

Thompson 2013, Ayala 2014

Hendershot 2014

Corbett 2002, Clothesrigger 1987, Brinker 2012

Kight 2014

Williams 2013

Martinez 2014

Ayala 2014, Benton 2013, Dynamex 2014-0

Aguirre 2015

Linder 2000

Alberts 2015

Bartold 2000, Bufil 2008, Jaimez 2010

Cruz 2015

Thompson 2013

Tellez 2015

Knapp 2011, Linder 2000
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III. RELEVANT CASES
Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order
Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 967, 981
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Knapp)
Cruz v. Sun World Int’l, LLC, 243 Cal. App. 4th 367, 373
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Brinker)
Alberts v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care, 241 Cal. App. 4th 388, 399
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Brinker and Linder)
Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1062
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App 2015) (citing Knapp and Linder)
Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1290, 1299
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Linder)
Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, 231 Cal. App. 4th 362, 373
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala, Benton, and Dynamex)

Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 232 Cal. App. 4th 50, 58
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala)
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 530
(Cal. 2014) (citing Brinker and Linder)
Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1143
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Knapp)
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Hataishi v. First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp., 223 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 1462
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Linder and Kaldenbach)
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 230 Cal. App. 4th 718, 725
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala), review granted and opinion superseded
sub nom. Dynamex Operations W. v. S.C. (Lee), 341 P.3d 438 (Cal. 2015)
Kight v. CashCall, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 112, 126
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Williams)
Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transp., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1221
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Knapp, Brinker, Corbett, and Clothesrigger)
Williams v. Super. Ct., 221 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1361
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Linder, Weinstat, and WITKIN, supra note 37)
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 4th 986, 995
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Sav-On and Fireside Bank)
Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 701, 716
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Jaimez)
Thompson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 217 Cal. App. 4th 719, 726
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Linder and Kaldenbach)

Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1022 (Cal. 2012)
(citing Fireside Bank and Hamwi)
Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 932, 939
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Linder)
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Ramirez v. Balboa Thrift and Loan, 215 Cal. App. 4th 765, 776
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Kaldenbach, Bartold, and Caro)
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Weinstat v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1223–24
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Bartold, Linder, and Capitol People)
Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1297–1298
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Linder, Sav-On, Bartold, and Bufil)
Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 843
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Bartold and Caro)
Bufil v. Dollar Fin. Group, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1204–05
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Linder, Capitol People, and Quacchia)
Capitol People First v. Dep’t of Dev. Servs., 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Linder)
Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1447
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Linder, Washington Mutual, and Corbett)
Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326–27 (Cal. 2004)
(citing Linder and Lockheed)

Corbett v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 649, 658
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Linder and Bartold)
Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 906, 914 (Cal. 2001)
(citing Linder)
Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (Cal. 2000)
(citing Richmond, Caro, and National Solar)
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Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1106 (Cal. 2003)
(citing Linder, Washington Mutual, and Richmond)
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Bartold v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828–29
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing National Solar, Daniels, and Clothesrigger),
superseded by legis. action, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 560
Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 655
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing National Solar, Clothesrigger, and Petherbridge)
Daniels v. Centennial Grp., Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th 467, 474
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing National Solar, Clothesrigger, and Richmond)
Nat’l Solar Equip. Owners’ Assn. v. Grumman Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1273, 1281
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Richmond and Clothesrigger)
Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Witkin)
Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 750
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Occidental Land, Hamwi, and Witkin)
Grogan-Beall v. Ferdinand Roten Galleries, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 3d 969, 975
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Occidental Land, Altman, and Hamwi)

Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 446 (Cal. 1979)
(citing no authority)
Altman v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 83 Cal. App. 3d 761, 765–66
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Hamwi)
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Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (Cal. 1981)
(citing Occidental Land and Fletcher)
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Hamwi v. Citinational-Buckeye Inv. Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 462, 472
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Occidental Land)
Occidental Land, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. 3d 355, 361 (Cal. 1976)
(citing Petherbridge)
Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 37 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199–200
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing Interpace and Gold Strike)
Interpace Corp. v. City of Phila., 438 F.2d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 1971)
(citing Platt)
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 792–93 (10th Cir. 1970)
(citing International Pipe)
City of N.Y. v. Int’l Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)
Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964)
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